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Abstract—In mixed-criticality systems, timely handling of I/O
is a key for the system being successfully implemented and
functioning appropriately. The criticality levels of functions and
sometimes the whole system are often dependent on the state
of the I/O. An I/O system for a MCS must provide simulta-
neously isolation/separation, performance/efficiency and timing-
predictability, as well as being able to manage I/O resource in an
adaptive manner to facilitate efficient yet safe resource sharing
among components of different criticality levels. Existing ap-
proaches cannot achieve all of these requirements simultaneously.
This paper presents a MCS I/O management framework, termed
MCS-IOV. MCS-IOV is based on hardware assisted virtualisation,
which provides temporal and spatial isolation and prohibits fault
propagation with small extra overhead in performance. MCS-
IOV extends a real-time I/O virtualisation system, by supporting
the concept of mixed criticalities and customised interfaces for
schedulers, which offers good timing-preditability. MCS-IOV
supports I/O driven criticality mode switch (the mode switch
can be triggered by detection of unexpected I/O behaviors,
e.g., a higher I/O utilization than expected) and timely I/O
resource reconfiguration up on that. Finally, We evaluated and
demonstrate MCS-IOV in different aspects.
I. INTRODUCTION
Safety-critical systems play an important role in many
medical and industrial fields (e.g. automotive, aerospace, etc.)
[27], [45], [68]. In safety-critical systems, integrating com-
ponents with different levels of criticalities (e.g. Automotive
Safety and Integrity Levels (ASILs) in ISO 26262 [41].)
onto a shared hardware platform has become increasingly
important [23], [26], [30]. This results from the diverse
functionalities required by modern safety-critical systems (e.g.
automated driving [49]), and the rapid evolution of executed
platforms [65]. Such systems are called Mixed-Criticality
Systems (MCS)s [26].
Traditionally, the MCS design enforces strong temporal,
spatial and fault isolation among software components of
different criticality levels, in order to prevent interference
from a lower criticality part to disrupt functionality, timing
and performance of a higher criticality part [26]. However,
strong isolation usually leads to huge resource waste and poor
performance [44]. In recent years, a significant trend in MCS
design is to provide certain form and level of resource sharing
(e.g., virtualization technology [64]) while keeping sufficient
temporal, spatial and fault isolation [53], [55].
In MCS, meeting real-time constraints is usually a key
requirement. According to safety assessment methods, e.g.,
Hazard Analysis (HA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), the failure of meeting
a deadline from a safety-related task can cause a hazard,
which may lead to a system-wide failure and eventually cause
an accident [42], [63], [67]. For example, the deadline miss
of a braking operation in an electric vehicle may cause a
severe car crash. In summary, a MCS usually should meet
the following requirements simultaneously: (i) Isolation, (ii)
Performance/Efficiency, (iii) Timing Predictability.
In the context of real-time systems, a widely studied MCS
model assumes that the Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET)
is estimated with different levels of confidence [22], [26], [39].
To certify the timing correctness of high-criticality tasks, it
is required to use WCET estimations with extremely high
confidence but typically very pessimistic (obtained by, e.g.,
static analysis). On the other hand, the timing correctness
of low-criticality tasks only requires to be validated using
WCET estimation with relatively lower confidence but much
less pessimistic (obtained by, e.g., testing) [70]. As for other
aspects in MCS design, resource sharing and isolation among
tasks of different criticality levels is a dilemma [26]. Com-
plete isolation leads to huge resource waste as the WCET
estimations used in the certification of high-criticality tasks
is very pessimistic. However, if resource sharing between
high-ciriticality and low-ciriticality tasks is allowed, both low-
ciriticality and high-criticality tasks have to be certified on the
high-criticality level due to the possible interference between
them [70].
Adaptive resource management [23], [24] is an effective
approach to address the above problem, the common idea of
which can be described as follows. The system first executes
at the low-criticality mode, in which the scheduling policy is
designed under the assumption that the execution time of each
task (either high-criticality or low-criticality) does not exceed
its low-criticality WCET bound. If this assumption is violated,
the system switches into the high-criticality mode, in which
the scheduling policy is designed assuming execution time of a
task may exceed its low-criticality WCET bound but does not
exceed its high-criticality WCET bound. In the high-criticality
mode, the scheduler either drop or only maintain a minimum
level of service for low-criticality tasks.
I/O is a vital part of embedded computer architectures [43],
[52] to interface with the physical world via sensors and
actuators, etc. The I/O behaviour greatly affects the execution
time of a computational task. However, I/O issue has been
ignored in most existing work on real-time MCS. In this
paper, we propose MCS-IOV, a new I/O architecture design for
MCS, which can fulfil the above mentioned common require-
ments of MCS, namely, isolation, performance/efficiency and
timing-predictability, as well as support adaptive I/O resource
management. More specifically, MCS-IOV has the following
features:
• MCS-IOV enables I/O virtualisation, and virtual ma-
chines are implemented as independent execution envi-
ronment for tasks, called criticality world. Hence, I/O
operations requested from different criticality worlds are
isolated in time, space and faults.
• MCS-IOV implements the majority of virtualisation and
I/O drivers in the hardware, which offloads system over-
head from the software and simplifies the I/O access
paths – the I/O performance can be improved compared
to native systems.
• MCS-IOV integrates the ready-built real-time I/O system
(BlueIO) and customised interfaces for theoretical anal-
ysis, which guarantees the timing predictability of I/O
operations.
• MCS-IOV provides a hardware-based system mode man-
ager, which supports (i) I/O-driven mode switch by
monitoring the I/O status and trigger mode switch timely
(instead of waiting until the overrun actually happens)
and (ii) adaptive I/O resource management up one that.
There have been existing work on MCS design and anal-
ysis considering the I/O issues. However, MCS-IOV is the
first systematical solution that fulfils all the three common
requirements of MCS (isolation, performance/efficiency and
timing predictability) as well as supports adaptive I/O resource
management. Moreover, MCS-IOV supports I/O-driven mode
switch. In existing work, a mode switch is triggered by detec-
tion of actual task overrun. With MCS-IOV, the mode switch
can be triggered by detection of unexpected I/O behavior (e.g.,
a higher I/O utilization than expected) to enable the system
early detect potential overrun and better satisfy the timing
requirement in the high-criticality mode.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II
reviews and discusses the related work on MCS I/O systems
in both industry and academia. Section III proposes the design
of a mixed-criticality I/O system (MCS-IOV) based on the
proposed methodology, followed by implementation details in
Section IV. Section V presents the evaluation of the MCS-IOV
system. A discussion and conclusions are given in Sections VI.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART
A. Industry State-of-the-Art
Currently, most commonly used safety-critical systems in
industry are not able to support a MCS execution context due
to lack of isolation support. Taking the automotive area as
an example, only a single-criticality system can be supported
by the latest SoCs targeting safety-critical systems from the
world’s top 3 (in terms of market share) automotive semi-
conductor suppliers [13].
NXP Semiconductors [11] have almost all current prod-
ucts with safety considerations. For example, the S32V234
processor, focusing on computer vision and machine learn-
ing, supports up to ASIL-B (ISO 26262) applications [9].
In these products, FS-SBCs are proposed specifically for
safety [8]. They contain S32x series MCUs (general purpose)
and MPC574x series MCUs (body control and gateway) [9],
[11]. However, FS-SBCs only support compliance with the
third critical level in ISO 26262 (i.e., ASIL-C). They are
expected to support the highest criticality level (ASIL-D)
within the next two years.
Infineon Technologies [10], are involved in different areas
of automotive, such as wireless control, power and security.
Among their products, the PRO-SIL family [7] is mainly
designed for safe-critical systems, including hardware, soft-
ware and other supporting features (e.g. for the development
process). The PRO-SIL family SoCs provide different method-
ologies to satisfy a high criticality level (SIL-3 in IEC 61508),
e.g., hardware redundancies (symmetric and asymmetric ar-
chitecture redundancies) [66], software redundancies, external
watchdog, core checks, etc. As shown in [66], the introduction
of these methodologies brings increased scalability, reduced
complexity and decreased power consumption compared to
traditional safety-related methodologies. However, a mixed-
criticality context sill can not be supported, due to lack support
on isolation.
Renesas Electronics [12] essentially classifies their automo-
tive products into three main categories: low power (e.g. sound
generator), power efficiency (e.g. engineering control) and
high performance (e.g. 3D graphics accelerators) [14]. Without
constraints on power and complexity of functionalities, the
RHx series (power efficiency category) achieves the best
safety features (ASIL C in ISO 26262). At the current stage,
their main concern is improving methodologies to satisfy
a higher criticality level with less power consumption and
better hardware efficiency (e.g. CRC operation, frequency
detection, RAM guard, etc.) [14], [15]. However, MCS is not
supported [12], [14] currently.
Instead of satisfying the essential requirements of a MCS,
the systems proposed from industry mainly focus on standard-
ised safety and security processes [57]. This issue has been
recognised and discussed by Graydon and Bate [36], as well
as Paulitsch et al. [57].
B. Prototypes for MCS I/O Systems
In order to satisfy isolation requirements in MCS I/O sys-
tems, different methodologies have been applied by prototype
systems developed in academia.
TDMA-based methodologies. TDMA provides temporal iso-
lation. For example, Carvajal and Fischmeister [28] proposed
an open-source framework (Atacama) for real-time Ethernet
for MCS. Cilku et al. [29] introduced a TDMA-based bus
arbitration scheme. Goossen et al. [35] used a TDMA-based
approach to schedule concurrent memory requests of the same
physical memory. TDMA is efficient in achieving temporal
isolation, not only in the MCS I/O system, but in the whole
MCS system. However, TDMA-based approaches cannot sat-
isfy the requirements on spatial and faults separation and
usually leads to resource waste.
TrustZone-based methodologies. ARM TrustZone was firstly
introduced into ARM application processor (Cortex-A) in
2004; recently, ARM released TrustZone-M for the new gener-
ation of ARM MCUs (Cortex-M) [59]. This technology is cen-
tred around the concept of two hardware-enforced protection
domains (secure world and non-secure world). Each world is
granted uneven privileges, with non-secure software prevented
from directly accessing secure world resources. LTZVisor [60]
and TZDKS [31] proposed MCS architectures using Trust-
Zone technologies, which achieve better system performance
compared to traditional TDMA-based approaches. Pinto et
al. then proposed Virtual-IO [56] based on LTZVisor, which
achieves a MCS I/O system with predictable I/O timing. The
main limitations of the TrustZone-based approach are twofold:
1) only two system modes can be supported; and 2) no adaptive
I/O resource management upon mode switches at runtime
supported.
Virtualisation-based methodologies. In virtualised systems,
the virtual machines (VMs) are logically isolated, which means
the applications executed in one VM can never affect another
VM, even if it breaks down. This is highly linked to the
requirement on isolation. For example, Groesbrink et al. [38]
utilised hypervisor-based virtualisation to separate system to
independant partitions (i.e. VMs). MultiPARTES [69] and
Airbus’ MP-IOV [55] used para-virtualisation [64] to es-
tablish an I/O virtualization system for a MCS; A ready-
built separation kernel (i.e., Quest-V [51]) was extended by
Missimer et al. [53] to support I/O virtualisation. In these
methodologies, different system modes are assigned to the
VMs, and a secondary scheduling between the VMs is also
built to guarantee the more critical I/O requests can be served
earlier (i.e., in [37], [38], partitioned RM scheduling of VMs
based on periodic servers with fixed period are implemented;
in [53], sporadic servers and priority inheritance bandwidth-
preserving servers are built to schedule I/O requests among
the VMs).
However these approaches involve complicated resource
management and complex paths of instructions. For a more
detailed analysis and discussion of virtualisation technologies,
please see our previous papers [44], [47].
Different from virtualization-based methodologies, Kim et
al. [48] proposed a methodology for MCS I/O systems from
a different perspective — i.e., operating system (OS) level.
As highlighted by Kim et al., OS is a largely ignored po-
tential interference of the I/O system in MCS. From OS
level, I/O accesses can be abstracted as memory accesses.
Hence, they proposed optimised memory management (i.e.,
isolating dynamic-memory allocations) and improved IPC-
related mechanisms (i.e., selective LLC bypass, concurrency
elimination, and LLC Locking) to improve I/O performance in
MCS and system performance. Drawbacks of this work are the
same as the virtualization-based approach. Moreover, isolation
provided from OS level is even weaker than the virtualization-
based approach [62].
Virtualisation relies on hardware [71], therefore different
hardware assistances have been promoted by today’s chip
manufacturers, in order to alleviate the issues virtualization
causes. For example, Intel’s Virtualisation Technology for
Directed I/O (VT-D) provides direct I/O access from VMs [40].
Munch et al. [54] proposed a MCS I/O virtualisation system
based on PCIe SR-IOV. The research was also extended in [55]
to use other hardware assistance (I/O MMU [25]). However,
even with hardware assistance, the I/O performance from the
criticality worlds (VMs) cannot reach the I/O performance
in a native system. Additionally, commonly used hardware
assistance in I/O virtualisation cannot solve the requirement
on predictability.
These lead to new challenges of the design of a MCS
I/O system. In this next section, we will have an overview
of the proposed MCS-IOV system, which could satisfy these
requirements. We will later come back to this discussion in a
case study in Section V-D.
III. MCS-IOV SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The proposed mixed-criticality I/O system (MCS-IOV) re-
lies on virtualisation and hardware assistance in its design
and implementation. In MCS-IOV, the isolation of independent
execution environment (i.e., criticality world) is achieved using
Virtual Machines [64]. Due to the introduction of virtualisa-
tion, the criticality worlds are logically isolated in time and
space and for faults. At the same time, each criticality world
is assigned a system mode, which can be changed by the
system integrator 1 during run-time. Moreover, the introduction
of hardware assistance offloads the majority of virtualisation
and low-layer I/O drivers onto the hardware and simplifies the
I/O access path. Therefore, the software overhead and system
performance (e.g. the I/O performance) can be improved,
compared to a native system. Meantime, MCS-IOV integrates
a ready-built real-time I/O system with customised interfaces
for theoretical analysis, which guarantees the predictability
of I/O operations (i.e., MCS-IOV hypervisor). The combined
design of hardware and software leads to the timely system
1System integrator is the person responsible for the integration of the
system, who pre-defines the condition of system mode change.
Fig. 1. MCS-IOV Architecture
mode changes being applied to both hardware and software
— avoiding criticality level inversion.
A. Context
In industry, a system architecture is often required to comply
with safety standards, which is a huge project that may require
large numbers of engineers to follow complicated procedures,
including safety concept analysis, safety mechanism imple-
mentation, verification, quantity analysis and system assess-
ment. Although MCS-IOV is a research prototype, we partially
follow ISO 26262 [41]. In the context of ISO 26262, MCS-
IOV is able to support four criticality levels, from ASIL A
(lowest) to ASIL D (highest). MCS-IOV has a general-purpose
design which can be applied to other safety standards and more
criticality levels.
B. General Architecture
The proposed architecture of MCS-IOV is shown in Fig-
ure 1. In the software layer, the RTOS kernel (e.g. FreeR-
TOS [6]) in each criticality world is able to executed in kernel
mode to achieve full functionality. At the same time, it can
provide a real-time environment for applications that need to
guarantee deadlines.
In the hardware layer, the MCS-IOV hypervisor is respon-
sible for system virtualisation (including resource allocation),
physical isolation between criticality worlds, and providing
high-layer access interfaces for user applications in the criti-
cality worlds. In the hypervisor, the of the criticality worlds
are stored in dedicated registers, which can be modified by
the system mode manager involved in the software layer dur-
ing run-time. In MCS-IOV hypervisor, customised interfaces
are enabled to support scheduling polices coming from new
research and analysis.
The architecture uses existing work in BlueIO [45] and
BlueTree [34], which are open-source and can be publicly
accessed. In our proposed system, BlueIO is used for I/O
virtualisation and BlueTree is used for memory accessing.
C. BlueIO
BlueIO is a scalable hardware-implemented real-time I/O
virtualisation system [45]. It follows the work of the Virtu-
alised Complicated Device Controller (VCDC) [44], which
scalably integrates I/O virtualisation and I/O drivers into the
hardware, with additional features of predictability and related
analysis. The BlueIO virtualises a physical I/O device to
multiple virtual I/O devices, provides access interfaces for
software applications and enables predictable I/O operations.
BlueIO can be physically connected to a multi-core or a
many-core system and is composed of three main parts (see
Figure 2):
Fig. 2. Structure of BlueIO (simplified and adopted from [45])
• I/O VMM – Maintains the virtualisation of I/O devices.
The main responsibility of I/O VMM is translating I/O
requests sent from each VM into actual I/O instructions
to operate a physical I/O. Considering that the function-
alities and features of I/O devices are different, it is
difficult to build a general purpose module to achieve
virtualisation for all types of I/O devices. In [45], they
propose a specific-purpose I/O VMM for commonly used
I/O devices, including UART, VGA, DMA, Ethernet, etc.
Further customised I/O VMM can be included in the
VCDC via documented interfaces [44].
• Low Layer I/O Drivers – Encapsulate specific I/O drivers
for a specific I/O device (e.g. read 16-bit data from a
particular address of the SPI flash.)
• Real-time I/O Controller – Binds I/O operations with
timing constraints, which allows real-time and timing-
accurate I/O operations [46].
D. BlueTree
BlueTree is a tree-like memory interconnect for many-
core systems that enables time-predictable memory read/write
from a number of CPUs [32], [33]. In this paper, BlueTree
is extended for real-time memory access of I/O devices, in
order to achieve particular functionalities (e.g. DMA-based
Ethernet communication [17]). We will not introduce the
implementation of the memory access module in this paper,
for more details please see [21], [32], [33].
IV. MCS-IOV DESIGN
MCS-IOV is included in a 2D mesh type open source
NoC [61]. The use of a NoC is not required by MCS-IOV,
as it is a general-purpose I/O system which is agnostic to the
type of bus and the CPUs. To support a complete MCS-IOV
system, the platform requires:
• Communication channels between MCS-IOV hypervisor
and CPUs;
• A global synchronisation timer;
• Memory access interface. In the proposed design, Blue-
Tree [32] is adopted as the memory access interface (see
Section III-D).
Fig. 3. Platform Overview (C - Processor Core; R - Router/Abiter; T -
Global Timer)
The use of MCS-IOV within the NoC is shown in Figure 3.
MCS-IOV hypervisor is physically connected to the home
port (via the physical link) of a router, the global timer
T , and the memory access interface (BlueTree). A complete
MCS-IOV system contains both software and hardware layers.
In the software layer, the independent criticality worlds and
the system mode manager are introduced. The MCS-IOV
hypervisor is introduced in the hardware layer.
A. Criticality Worlds and Guest OS
In the system, four independent criticality worlds are pro-
posed as virtual machines. The virtualisation has the following
features:
• Bare-metal virtualisation [64] – the guest OS in the
criticality world can be executed on processors directly,
without the host OS. Therefore, a guest OS is able to
execute in kernel mode to achieve full privileges.
• Para-virtualisation [50] – the kernel of the guest OS
requires modifying in the I/O management, which has
to be replaced by high level I/O drivers. This allows a
smaller OS software footprint and simplified I/O access
paths.
(a) Native System
(b) MCS-IOV
Fig. 4. FreeRTOS in Native System and MCS-IOV
Currently, in our proposed design, three OS kernels have
been modified to support I/O virtualisation: FreeRTOS [6],
µCosII [16] and Xilkernel [19]. In Figure 4, we use the FreeR-
TOS kernel as an example to demonstrate the modifications
in an OS kernel.
Fig. 5. Structure of MCS-IOV Hypervisor (grey shading indicates the response path)
1) Isolation: In our proposed design, each criticality world
(guest OS) independently runs in kernel mode with full privi-
leges and without recognising the existence of other criticality
worlds or the hypervisor (MCS-IOV). The OS kernels running
independently with full privileges may result in illegal ac-
cesses, including illegal address accesses (e.g. criticality world
K1 tries to access an address space belonged to criticality
world K2) and illegal requests (e.g. criticality world K1 tries
to release an I/O being used by criticality world K2). MCS-
IOV hypervisor will detect and block these malicious requests
by checking a resource allocation table inside a dedicated
module (see Section IV-C). With the assistance of MCS-IOV
hypervisor, isolation in space and faults can be achieved. Note,
the allocation of hardware resources is decided by the system
integrator.
2) Resource Efficiency: Unlike the native OS kernel (Fig-
ure 4(a)), user applications in the modified kernel (Figure 4(b))
are able to directly access and operate virtualised I/O devices
through the provided high-layer interfaces, without the inter-
position of the OS kernel. The simplification of I/O access
paths and the hardware implementation of I/O drivers signifi-
cantly improves the resource efficiency with increased system
performance and decreased software overhead compared to a
traditional virtualised system, and even the native system.
Simultaneously, user applications running on a native OS
kernel can be directly ported to the modified kernel in the
MCS-IOV system, since the original interfaces on both OS
kernels and the (virtualised) I/O devices are kept.
B. System Mode Manager
In the software layer, parallel to the criticality worlds, the
system mode manager is also introduced. Different from the
criticality worlds, the system mode manager is allocated to
a dedicated processor and never uses shared resources such
as I/O resources. Its main responsibility is assigning system
modes to different criticality worlds during run time and
allocating the execution time of each criticality world (see
Section IV-C).
1) Run-time System Mode Switch: The system mode of
each criticality world is mapped to a corresponding dedicated
32-bit register inside MCS-IOV hypervisor. In the system
mode manager, there is only one process running continuously,
which is used by the system integrator to modify the system
modes of the criticality worlds by updating the corresponding
registers. For example, system mode manager can be config-
ured to switch the system mode of a criticality world(s) while
detecting the overload of I/O buffers.
2) Limitations: Due to blocked I/O operations by MCS-
IOV hypervisor [58], the mode switches of the criticality
world can only be issued after each complete I/O operation.
Hence, a delay in the mode switches will be introduced. The
maximum delay equals the worst-case execution time of the
corresponding I/O operation.
C. MCS-IOV Hypervisor
The MSC-IOV hypervisor consists of the following main
parts (see Figure 5):
• System Mode Manager Path: Provides the interface from
the system mode manager (see Section IV-B) to the MCS-
IOV hypervisor via the NoC mesh. Inside the system
mode manager path, the attributes of each criticality
world are stored in independent registers. Specifically, the
system modes can be accessed at addresses 0x00, 0x04,
0x08 and 0x0C respectively offset to the MSC-IOV’s
BaseAddress. Moreover, the time server2 allocated to
each criticality world can be configured at addresses
0x10, 0x14, 0x18 and 0x1C respectively offset to the
MSC-IOV’s BaseAddress. These two types of attributes
can be used as input parameters to the scheduler in I/O
pools.
• I/O Path: provides the interface between criticality worlds
and I/Os. As shown on the right of Figure 5, the I/O
path mainly contains the I/O pools and the BlueIO.
Specifically, the I/O pool schedules I/O requests and I/O
responses to different criticality worlds, whilst BlueIO
provides the functionality of I/O virtualisation and en-
capsulates the corresponding I/O drivers.
1) Configurability: As shown in Figure 5, the I/O pool can
be divided into two paths:
• The Request Path is responsible for transmitting I/O
requests from different criticality worlds to I/O devices.
• The Response Path (shown in grey) is responsible for
transmitting I/O responses from I/O devices back to the
corresponding criticality worlds.
In both paths, an independent scheduler is introduced to
schedule the I/O requests/responses to the different criticality
worlds. The scheduling policies of the schedulers are con-
figurable, and can be switched between the basic scheduling
polices (e.g. Fixed-Priority, Round-Robin) and customised
scheduling policies (e.g. dynamic time servers). An interface
to the system integrators to implement the scheduling polices
based on state-of-art theoretical analysis is also proposed.
2) Predictability: As described in Section IV-C, the I/O
path is composed of the I/O pools and BlueIO. As introduced
in [44] and [45], BlueIO enables I/O virtualisation with
improved predictability compared to a native system. At the
same time, the schedulers in each I/O pool support real-time
scheduling. Therefore, MCS-IOV significantly increases the
predictability of the I/O operations compared to a traditional
virtualised system.
3) Scalability: The design of the I/O pool is generic. Hence,
MSC-IOV can be easily expanded to support different I/Os
(e.g. CAN, LAN, etc.) by duplicating the I/O pool and then
connecting the new I/O pool between the many-core system
and the BlueIO.
V. EVALUATION
The MCS-IOV hypervisor was implemented using Bluespec
System Verilog [3] and synthesised on a Xilinx ZC706 devel-
opment board [20]. The following evaluation focuses on I/O
2Time servers are implemented to support some theoretical models, and
can be disabled by the system integrator if not required.
devices and I/O systems. NB We do not consider the effects
caused by the NoC and routing protocols.
In the evaluation, the MCS-IOV hypervisor was connected
to a 3×3 2D mesh type open source real-time NoC [61],
which contains 4 MicroBlaze processors running independent
criticality worlds. The OS kernel running in each criticality
world is a modified guest OS kernel (FreeRTOS v9.0.0)
described in Section IV-A. The software on MicroBlaze pro-
cessors is compiled using the Xilinx MicroBlaze GNU tool
chain [18]. The architecture is shown in Figure 6(c). To enable
a comparison, two baseline systems are introduced (with all
architectures running at 100 MHz):
• Baseline System – Native (BS-N) (Figure 6(a)): The NoC
system without hardware assistance. Scheduling related
to shared resources is undertaken by the routers/arbiter.
Each processor is deemed to be an independent criticality
world [26], [70].
• Baseline System – TZDKS [31] (BS-T) (Figure 6(b)):
The MCS built on ARM trust-zone technology. In the sys-
tem, four independent criticality worlds are implemented
in the secure and non-secure worlds of processor (1,0)
and processor (2,0) respectively.
(a) Baseline System: Native (BS-N) (b) Baseline System: T (BS-T)
(c) MCS-IOV System
Fig. 6. Experimental Platforms. R - Router/ Arbiter; M - MicroBlaze Processor;
A - ARM Processor; T - Global Timer; CW: Criticality World; SMM: System
Mode Manager.
The evaluation of MCS-IOV should mainly relate to the
essential requirements of separation, resource efficiency, pre-
dictability and run-time system mode switch. Specifically, the
separation requirement belongs to functionalities which were
introduced in Sections IV-A1 – temporal, spatial and fault
isolation can be simultaneously supported.
TABLE I
HARDWARE OVERHEAD (IMPLEMENTED IN FPGA)
Involved
I/O
Supported
Criticality Levels
Hardware Consumption
LUTs
% of
ZC706
Registers
% of
ZC706
BRAMs DSP
Power
(mW)
Maxium
Frequency (Mhz)
LIN
4 831 0.38% 874 0.20% 0 0 13 324
8 962 0.44% 1,093 0.25% 0 0 15 318
16 1,159 0.53% 1,339 0.32% 0 0 16 311
LIN+CAN
4 2,164 0.99% 1,967 0.45% 0 0 23 288
8 2,426 1.11% 2,317 0.53% 0 0 25 277
16 2,820 1.29% 2,842 0.65% 0 0 29 260
LIN+CAN
+ETH
4 4,416 2.02% 4,416 1.01% 0 0 43 249
8 4,787 2.19% 4,984 1.14% 0 0 47 236
16 5,334 2.44% 6,007 1.39% 0 0 55 204
TABLE II
HARDWARE OVERHEAD (IMPLEMENTED IN VLSI)
Involved
I/O
Supported
Criticality Levels
Hardware Consumption
AND AIO DEEPOS HA INV MUX NAND NOR OAI OR XNOR XOR Total
LINX
4 513 2,381 2,188 39 2,782 43 1,929 1,442 1,849 232 18 22 13,438
8 601 2,649 2,344 40 3,238 45 1,984 1,501 1,887 249 19 24 14,581
16 694 3,010 2,683 52 3,586 54 2,618 1,822 2,314 314 23 30 17,200
LIN+CAN
4 1,080 5,271 5,281 83 6,112 89 4,401 3,168 4,034 519 37 51 30,126
8 1,258 6,502 5,808 96 6,793 118 4,731 3,493 4,566 627 44 52 34,088
16 1,435 6,642 6,360 108 8,028 135 5,782 4,236 5,880 699 57 63 39,425
LIN+CAN
+ETH
4 2,594 11,604 9,704 178 13,171 208 8,747 7,074 9,349 1,034 79 114 63,856
8 2,719 11,984 10,949 217 16,049 214 9,897 7,463 10,419 1,249 103 114 71,377
16 2,735 12,884 13,328 238 16,767 236 11,959 8,815 10,242 1,319 103 129 78,755
Hence, the evaluated metrics mainly focus on resource
efficiency, predictability and run-time system mode switch.
A. Resource Efficiency
The resource efficiency of an evaluated system is classified
as both software and hardware overhead and performance,
which are evaluated in this section.
1) Software Overhead: In this section, we evaluate the
memory footprint of MSC-IOV and the different versions of
FreeRTOS running in the three evaluated systems (memory
size tools: the Xilinx Microblaze GNU tool chain [18] and the
ARM GNU tool chain [1]). In the evaluation, the native version
of FreeRTOS (FreeRTOS BS-N) was fully-featured [5], and
it is the foundation of the other FreeRTOS kernels. Table 7
presents the collected measurements.
Fig. 7. Memory Footprint of MCS-IOV and RTOS kernels in the Evaluated
Systems (nsw: non-secure world; sw: secure world)
As can be seen, an extra 23 KB memory footprint is
introduced in MCS-IOV, resulting from the introduction of the
system mode manager, which is 7.12% of the native freeRTOS.
The native full-featured FreeRTOS (FreeRTOS BS-N) requires
337,616 bytes (≈330KB). The higher memory footprint com-
pared to the official version [6] results from introducing the
drivers for the Ethernet, CAN and LIN. When it comes to
the BS-T, there is no increment on the OS kernel running in
the non-secure worlds (FreeRTOS BS-T nsw). However, the
OS kernel running in the secure worlds (FreeRTOS BS-T sw)
suffers from a 26.77% increment of software overhead, which
is mainly introduced by virtualisation and the corresponding
monitor [31]. In the MCS-IOV system, the FreeRTOS MCS-
IOV only consumes 234,798 bytes (≈229KB) memory foot-
print, which is 69.4% and 57.8% of the FreeRTOS BS-N
and FreeRTOS BS-T sw, respectively. The main reason behind
such a low memory footprint is the implementation of para-
virtualisation (see Section IV-A), which significantly removes
the software overhead.
2) Hardware Overhead: The BS-N (Figure 6(a)) does
not require any extra hardware assistance. However, the
BS-T (Figure 6(a)) requires the support of ARM TrustZone
technology, which is integrated into all ARM Cortex-A and
the latest Cortex-M33 processors [2]. In this section, we
evaluate the hardware overhead of MCS-IOV (i.e., MCS-IOV
hypervisor) in both FPGA and VLSI.
In the FPGA implementation (Table I), Vivado (v2018.3) is
used to synthesise and implement MCS-IOV hypervisor on the
Xilinx ZC706 FPGA board [20]. The hardware consumption is
mainly summarised as the use of LUTs, registers, BRAMs and
power consumption. For the VLSI (see Table II), a Cadence
RTL encounter compiler (v11.20) [4] is used to synthesise the
MCS-IOV hypervisor into the gate level using the open source
MOSIS SCMOS TSMC 0.18µm library (OSU SOC v2.7).
Fig. 8. I/O Throughput (T-1: Task 1; T-2: Task 2; T-3: Task 3)
The hardware consumption is summarised in the use of the
essential logic gates.3 In both evaluations, we increased the
number of I/O devices involved and the supported criticality
levels respectively in order to show the scaled hardware
consumption.
The resource efficiency of MCS-IOV hypervisor is shown
in Tables 1 and 2, note that even the MCS-IOV supporting
LIN, CAN and Ethernet with 16 criticality levels only requires
2.44% LUTS and 1.39% registers of the ZC706 FPGA board.
Moreover, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, hardware con-
sumption linearly increases with the number of I/Os and
CPUs. At the same time, the number of supported I/Os
dominates hardware consumption. For example, compared to
a 4-criticality system with LIN and CAN (FPGA: 2,164 LUT
and 1,967 registers; VLSI: 30,126 gates), an extra 30.30%
LUTs and 44.44% registers, or 30.87% gates are required
to support an extra 8 criticality levels. However, to support
an extra I/O device (Ethernet), an additional 104.04% LUTs,
124.44% registers or 111.96% gates are consumed.
3) Performance: In this section, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of three architectures via the I/O throughput. The I/O
device used in the experiments is an SPI nor-flash (model:
S25FL128S). In the criticality worlds of each architecture,
three software applications are set to run and continuously
read data (32 bits) from the flash. The bytes written from
each application per second is recorded as the I/O throughput
(KB/s). In each criticality world, Round-Robin is used as the
scheduling policy for the software applications. Meantime, the
execution time of each criticality world is allocated as 10%,
20%, 30% and 40% (from ASIL A to ASIL D). All exper-
iments were implemented 1,000 times. NB, other theoretical
models can be also applied.
As shown in Figure 8, the behaviours of I/O throughput
in each architecture are subject to the scheduling policies
and time allocations of the MCS context. In the criticality
worlds of BS-T, due to the introduction of virtualisation,
3In order to make the numbers readable, the names of the gates are
summarised. For example, the 2-entries OR gate and 4-entries OR gate are
summarised to the OR gate in the table.
I/O throughput suffers from approximately 30% reductions
compared to BS-N (low resource efficiency). Thanks to the
hardware implementation of virtualisation and I/O drivers, in
each criticality world of the MCS-IOV, better performance on
I/O throughput is always achieved, which is about 300%, and
425%, respectively compared to BS-N and BS-T. Moreover,
as shown in the normalised comparison, the average I/O
performance in each criticality world of MCS-IOV is always
close to the best case, which is more than 95%.
B. Predictability
As shown in the evaluation results of Section V-A3 (see
Figure 8), in each criticality world, there is less variance in
the I/O performance in the MCS-IOV than the other baseline
systems, showing better predictability.
Furthermore, the experiments in this section are designed
to measure the I/O predictability by evaluating the Ethernet
response time (loop back mode). Specifically, in the critical-
ity worlds of each architecture, three software applications
continuously send 1 KB Ethernet packets using the MAC
protocol. Information about the I/O response time is recorded
and summarised. A lower I/O response time (for both average
and worst-case) indicates a higher I/O performance and better
resource efficiency, and a lower variance means better pre-
dictability. In each criticality world, Round-Robin is used as
the scheduling policy for software applications. The execution
time of each criticality world is set as 10%, 20%, 30% and
40% (from ASIL A to ASIL D). All experiments were run
1,000 times. NB, other theoretical models can also be applied.
As shown in Table III, among criticality worlds with the
same system modes, the I/O operations in the MCS-IOV
system always have a shorter response time (in both average
and worst cases). This indicates that MCS-IOV has a better
resource efficiency than the baseline systems. Furthermore,
when it comes to variation in the 1,000 experiments, the
I/O response time in the MCS-IOV always has less variation.
Specifically, when the criticality worlds are executed in highest
critical system mode (ASIL D), the MCS-IOV only suffers
from 16.8% and 18.6% variation respectively, compared to
TABLE III
I/O RESPONSE TIME OF LOOP BACK 1KB ETHERNET PACKETS IN EVALUATED SYSTEMS (UNIT: µs)
Citicality World
Baseline System: Native System Baseline System: TZDK MCS MCS-IOV
Average Worst-case Variation Average Worst-case Variation Average Worst-case Variation
VM1 (ASIL D) 72.85 77.43 8.35 78.25 83.51 7.51 22.33 23.22 1.41
VM2 (ASIL C) 164.32 181.82 25.33 180.14 193.32 21.21 51.25 53.52 3.83
VM3 (ASIL B) 250.99 278.49 42.21 282.17 299.02 31.29 77.49 80.21 4.28
VM4 (ASIL A) 351.09 393.63 70.21 378.32 402.03 45.38 103.93 107.33 6.60
BS-N and BS-T. When the lowest system mode (ASIL A) is
assigned, these numbers are decreased to 9.4% and 14.5%.
These experimental results demonstrate significant improve-
ments in the predictability of the MCS-IOV system.
C. Delay of System Mode Switches
In this section, we evaluate the delay of system mode
switches in MCS-IOV (this functionality is not supported
in the baseline systems). The experiment setup is based on
the experimental configurations in Section V-B. Additionally,
instructions of system mode switch on each criticality world
are requested randomly during runtime. The time from an
instruction request until it can be completely issued was
recorded as the delay of system mode switch. The experiments
were run 1,000 times.
Fig. 9. Delay of System Mode Switches in MCS-IOV
As shown in Figure 9, the average delay of system mode
switches among different criticality worlds (from ASIL A
to ASIL D) are: 139.497 µs, 105.641 µs, 93.11 µs and
71.15 µs. In criticality worlds with lower system modes,
significant variances were seen between the average delay
and the worst case: 101% (ASIL A) and 112% (ASIL B).
Conversely, in the criticality worlds with higher system modes,
the variances decreased to 64.72% (ASIL C) and 68.52%
(ASIL D), respectively. Although the delay to system mode
switches is controlled at the microsecond level in MCS-IOV,
the predictability still requires further improvement in the
future.
D. Case Study
In this case study, we consider a 16 PE (Microblazes) real-
time NoC, with a 5x5 2D mesh architecture, and a single
Ethernet device. Specifically, PE 0 - 7 execute the main func-
tions (i.e., task sets), and PE 8 - 15 generate I/O contentions
to the system. The task sets contain 40 high-criticality tasks,
and 40 low-criticality tasks. The release period of the tasks
are all set to be 20 ms, with deadline equals to period; and
the computational execution time of each task is between 0.5
ms and 1 ms. During each execution of the task, a 2 KB
Ethernet packet is sent respectively at three time points: 0.25,
0.5 and 0.75 of the task execution time (See Figure 10). N.B.,
according to 1,000 times experimental results, the average I/O
response time of sending a 2 KB Ethernet packets from one of
the NoC nodes without any I/O contention is 27.10 us (0.0271
ms) — around 3% of the execution time of a task.
Fig. 10. Example of a Task Repetitively Requesting an Asynchronous I/O
In each experiment, 80 tasks are randomly allocated to PE0
- PE7 (10 tasks per PE). The initial utilisation of each PE
is set to be 50% with Round-Robin scheduling policy. Three
evaluated system models (i.e. non-MCS, MCS with AMC and
MCS-IOV) are respectively executed with different number
of I/O contentions (I). In AMC models, the WCET of each
task (without I/O contention) is achieved via experimental
measurements, and the optimistic estimation of the WCET
is set to be 2.5 and 1.5 times of the experimental results
respectively in AMC 2.5 and AMC 1.5 4. As only two system
modes are evaluated, we mapped ASIL A and B as the low-
criticality level, and ASIL C and D as the high-criticality
level in the MCS-IOV system. Specifically, in the MCS-IOV
system, PE 0 and 1 are configured to criticality world A; PE
2 and 3 are configured to criticality world B; PE 4 and 5 are
configured to criticality world C; PE 6 and 7 are configured
to criticality world D. Furthermore, the system mode manager
of the MCS-IOV is configured to switch the system mode of
all the criticality worlds by detecting the overall usage of I/O
pool being greater than 80% (MCS-IOV 80) and 40% (MCS-
4In AMC-x, the WCET of each task is set to be x times of its measured
maximum execution time (without I/O contention). Meantime, the system is
designed to switched to the high-critical mode while any task being detected
to exceed its WCET.
IOV 40) respectively. Each experiment executes 200 ms (10
periods), and all the experiments are performed 1,000 times.
Fig. 11. Case Study: Deadline Miss Rate
Figure 11 demonstrates the deadline miss rates of the three
evaluated models (five systems) with different number of I/O
contentions. The experiments shows:
• The ‘short’ I/O operation can significantly increase the
execution time of tasks. For example, in a non-MCS
system, the average deadline miss of the system increases
to 66%, when I = 8.
• Compared to a non-MCS, conventional MCS (i.e., AMC)
can somehow alleviate the issue. However, with the
number of I/O contentions increasing, the deadline miss
rate also increased dramatically. Specifically, when I < 5,
the deadline miss rate is around 5% (mainly caused by
criticality level inversion); when I > 5, the deadline
miss rate increased dramatically (mainly caused by I/O
contention).
• Schedulability of MCS-IOV is significantly improved
compared to conventional methodologies, because of en-
hanced I/O performance and hardware support of run-
time system mode switches. Specifically, enhanced I/O
performance decreases the impact of I/O to task execution
time; and the hardware support of run-time system mode
switches effectively avoid the criticality level inversion.
• In MCS-IOV systems, as the number of I/O contention
increases, the schedulability of the system will be signif-
icantly decreased in a certain situation (I = 7). This is
the maximum capacity of the system.
In order to demonstrate the criticality level inversion clearly,
Figure 12 specifies the average deadline miss rate of each
evaluated system in each period while the number of I/O
contention equalling to 8 (I = 8).
As shown in Figure 12, AMC-based systems and MCS-
IOV systems are all switched to the high-critical mode in the
first period. In AMC-based systems, the deadline miss rates
can be only stabilised after 8 periods, due to criticality level
inversion (i.e., black box in Figure 12). Conversely, With the
support from hardware in MCS-IOV systems, criticality level
inversion can be eliminated (i.e., the deadline miss rates can
be stabilised immediately after system model switch).
Fig. 12. Case Study: Deadline Miss Rates of Three Systems in Each Period
Box: Criticality Level Inversion (Except non-MCSs, System Model Switches
Occur in the First Period)
VI. CONCLUSION
In safety/life-critical systems, MCSs are proliferating at
a rapid pace in both academia and industry, mainly due to
the various functionalities required by modern safety-critical
systems and fast evolution of execution platforms. In MCS,
the I/O system is vitally important, since the system modes of
the whole system are often determined by the use of I/O. In
a MCS I/O system, multiple features are often simultaneously
required – isolation/separation, performance/efficiency, and
predictability. Currently, existing approaches cannot achieve
all these requirements at the same time.
MCS-IOV is the first systematical solution that fulfils all
the three common requirements of MCS as well as supports
adaptive I/O resource management. Moreover, MCS-IOV sup-
ports I/O-driven mode switch — e.g., the mode switch can
be triggered by detection of unexpected I/O behaviors (e.g.,
a higher I/O utilization than expected) to help the system
to better satisfy the timing requirement in the high-criticality
mode.
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